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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code
Ann.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
A.

Issues Presented.

1.

Did the trial court err in dismissing the claims of Miller?

2.

Did the trial err in ruling that the State is entitled to recover from the

bonding company the full amount on the bond by virtue of the Spa's failure to refund the
unused portion of membership fees to all members holding valid, unexpired membership
contracts with Quest at the time of the closure of the spa?
3.

Did the trial court err in ruling that Rule 152-7-4.F of the Utah

Administrative Code is not imposed upon Salt Lake County an obligation to honor the
membership contracts of the Spa in effect at the time of the purchase of the facility on
June 15, 1995 as is the memorandum decision?
B.

Standard of Review.

The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, and not as a matter of fact, that the claims
of Miller should be dismissed and that County had no obligation to honor the
membership contracts at the time of the purchase of the spa facility by the County.
Questions of law are reviewed by this Court for correctness. No particular deference is to
be given to an agency's, or lower court's statutory interpretation. See, Lunnen v. Utah
Dept. of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70 (Utah App.1994); State v. Larson, 865 P.2d 1355
(Utah

1993); Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Com 'n of State of Utah, 791 P.2d
511 (Utah 1990).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant statutes are:
1.

The Health Spa Services Protection Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-23-1 et seq.

(1991). (Addendum 1).
2.

Utah Admin. Rule 152-7-2 et seq. (1990). (Addendum 2).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

The original action relevant to this matter was brought by the State of Utah, by
and through the Division of Consumer Protection, (hereinafter the "Division" or the
"State") against Boyd. L. Jentzsch dba Quest Sport and Fitness, Homestead Insurance
Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation and International Special Events & Recreation
Association, a risk retention purchasing group. This action was filed in the Third Judicial
District Court under Civil No. 950906098AA. In this initial action, the State sought to
recover from the Defendants the sum of $50,000.00, representing the amount of the bond
placed by Mr. Jentzsch in accordance with the Health Spa Protection Services Act
(hereinafter the "Act").
A subsequent action was filed by the Appellant, David W. Miller (hereinafter
"Miller"), against the State of Utah by and through the Division of Consumer Protection
and Salt Lake County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah. This action was filed
in the Third Judicial District Court under Civil No. 950906977CV. This action was
subsequently consolidated with the prior matter. In this companion action, Miller, as the
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guarantor of the bond posted by Jentzsch, sought to require the State of Utah to enforce
its rules and to require Salt Lake County, as the purchaser of a spa facility, to honor and
recognize the unexpired membership contracts outstanding at the time Salt Lake County
purchased the Quest Sport & Fitness spa facility.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The appeal is taken from the Memorandum Decision and Summary Judgment
entered in this matter on June 2, 1997 in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Ann M. Stirba presiding.
Oral Argument on the cross motions of the parties for summary judgment was
held before the District Court on April 10, 1997. At that time, the court entered an oral
judgment granting the motions for summary judgment of the Appellee's, State of Utah
and Salt Lake County and denying the motion for summary judgment of the
Plaintiff/Appellant, Miller. Thereafter, a proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment were filed by the State and the County. A timely objection was filed by
Appellant. Pursuant to the objections, the order of the court was amended and an
appropriate order entitled "Memorandum Decision and Summary Judgment" was entered
by the court on June 2, 1997.
The ruling of the trial court was that the rules of the state of Utah did not apply to
Salt Lake County and that Salt Lake County had, therefore, no obligation to honor the
unexpired contracts. The effect of this ruling is to require the bond to be paid, which will,
in turn, require that Miller pay the bonding company. A Notice of Appeal was timely
filed by Miller as to the trial court's ruling.
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C.

Statement of Facts.

Prior to the filing of these actions, a health spa facility, known as Quest Sport &
Fitness (hereinafter the "Spa") was being operated in Salt Lake County by Boyd L.
Jentzsch. (R. 182). In accordance with the Utah Spa Services Protection Act (the "Act"),
Mr. Jentzsch, in order to operate the spa facility was required to post a $50,000.00 bond.
On or about September 21, 1994, Mr. Jentzsch submitted to the State of Utah the
necessary and appropriate bond that had been obtained through the personal guarantee of
Miller. (R.183). The spa facility was located at approximately 10300 South Redwood
Road, South Jordan, Utah. Mr. Jentzsch operated the facility until approximately January
3, 1995, at which time Mr. Jentzsch closed the facility due to financial difficulties, which
had resulted in the filing of a bankruptcy. (R. 184).
The method of operation followed by Mr. Jentzsch was typical of other spa
facility operations. The Spa had sold to members of the public membership contracts of
varying lengths, not exceeding three (3) years. In fact, the majority of the contracts are in
the 1 to 2 year range.
The actual facility, itself, was not owned by Mr. Jentzsch. In fact, the facility was
owned by an entity known as the "Country Courthouse Trust" and was leased to Mr.
Jentzsch for the purposes of operating the spa facility. (R.183). The building was built
originally for the purposes of operating a spa facility. It is, for all intents and purposes, a
specialty use building with no other practical purpose.
Upon the closing of the facility, efforts were made both by Mr. Jentzsch, as well
as others, to sell the facility to another entity who would operate the same as a spa.
Ultimately, the spa facility was purchased by Salt Lake County (the "County"), who
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immediately reopened the same as a health and fitness center. However, the County
refused to honor the outstanding and unexpired membership contracts held by members
of the public to the spa facility. The State of Utah determined that the balance due on the
unexpired contracts was in excess of $50,000.00 and called the bond.
The State of Utah, by and through the Division of Consumer Protection, has
promulgated various rules that are to be used in connection with the application of the
Act. One of those rules, Rule 152-7-4.F (Addendum 2) specifically provides that the
purchaser of a health spa facility shall be obligated to honor the unexpired membership
contracts held by the public. If Salt Lake County, as the new purchaser of the facility, had
been required to honor the provisions of this Rule, there would be no need to call upon
the bond which has been given by Mr. Jentzsch and guaranteed by Appellant Miller.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court, pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, refused to impose the
obligations of the Rules on the County. The trial court specifically held that the Rule was
invalid on the theory that the Rule was inconsistent with the Act and went beyond the
scope of the Act. (R.441-49).
The position of Miller is that the Rule is not inconsistent with, nor beyond the
scope of, the Act and that the Rule should be applied to the County's operation of the spa
facility in the same manner that the Rule would be applied to a private owner's operation
of the spa facility. Miller does not deny that the Act specifically exempts the operation of
a spa facility by a government agency. However, the exemption given by the Act goes
solely to the requirement of a government entity to post a bond. Releasing governmental
agencies from posting bonds is a common, and well-understood, fact of life. It is
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grounded on the theory that the government, having unlimited resources, can stand any
liability or damages which arise from its own misconduct.
However, there is no exemption in the Act from the other protections that the Act
affords. The State of Utah, by and through the Division of Consumer Protection, has
enumerated the protections of the Act in its rules. While a government entity may not
have to post a bond, it should be required to afford the public the other protections of the
Act, including the protection that unexpired membership contracts will be honored by the
purchaser of a spa facility.
The trial court erred in ruling that Rule 152-7-4.F could not, and did not, apply to
the County. The trial court interpreted the Act to mean that a private owner or operator of
a health spa facility should give all the protections which the Act and the rules afford; but
that a governmental entity, as an owner or operator, need give none of those protections.
The trial court should have upheld the rule as not being inconsistent with the Act, nor
beyond its terms or scope. The trial court should have ordered the County to assume the
unexpired membership contracts of the prior operator of the same facility.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INVALIDATING RULE 152-7-4.F
Unlike most appeals of summary judgment rulings, Miller does not deny that the
facts of this case are undisputed. No one denies that the Quest Sport & Fitness spa
facility closed leaving unexpired membership contracts that were being held by members
of the public. It is not disputed that Salt Lake County, shortly thereafter, purchased that
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same facility from its owner and thereafter operated the spa facility virtually identical to
the one operated by Mr. Jentzsch.
Further, there is no dispute that the Act requires private operators of health spa
facilities to post a bond. The clear intent of the bond requirement is to insure that if the
facility closes and never reopens, those members of the public having unexpired
membership contracts will get their money back. Miller does not debate the fact that the
Act does not require governmental operators of health spa facilities to post a similar
bond.
There is likewise no dispute in this case that the Division had the authority to
make rules that would give full effect to the Act. The clear purposes of the Act are to
protect the consuming public from operators of health spa facilities who simply close the
facility leaving members of the public with unexpired, paid membership contracts and no
place to use them. The purpose of the enactment of rules of the Division is to maximize
the protection of the Act for the benefit of the public.
In essence, the trial court has unnecessarily invalidated a Rule on the premise that
it imposes a responsibility on the government that the Act did not impose. In so doing,
the trial court has violated a number of rules of statutory construction and appellate
review.
It is recognized that rules promulgated by an agency are clothed with a
presumption of validity and cannot be ignored. An agency is held to the rules that it
makes, unless there is some compelling reason for noncompliance. See State, Etc v.
Utah Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah 1980).

It is also well established that a reviewing court is to review an agency's own
application of its rules for reasonableness and rationality. See Lunnen v. Utah
Department of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70 (Utah App. 1994); Union Pacific R. v.
Auditing D/v., 842 P.2d 876 (Utah 1992).
In addition, statutes are to be construed by the court liberally and with a view to
effecting their objectives and avoiding injustice. Brickyard Homeowners Ass *n v.
Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983). When construing statutes, it is well
known that legislative intent is to be given full enforcement in such a way as to avoid
unlikely, strained or absurd results. See State v. Landrum, 832 P.2d 1359 (Wash. App.
1992).
Finally, statutory interpretations are questions of law to which a "correction of
error" standard is to applied. No particular deference is to be given to an agency's (or
lower court's) interpretation. See Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Com 'n of
State of Utah, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990).
Each of the above-stated principles was not followed by the court below, resulting
in a strained interpretation of the Act, an uneven application of the Rule and an injustice
to the Appellant. The trial court did not need to find that the Rule was inapplicable to
government-owned spa facilities for the simple reason that the Rule does not conflict with
the Act itself.
The trial court ruled that since the Act did not impose a bonding requirement on
government operators of spa facilities, the rules promulgated by the Division, likewise, do
not apply to government operators of spa facilities. The effect of the trial court's ruling
was to say that none of the protections given by the Act and by the rules apply to
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government-operated spa facilities. The result is that the consuming public is protected if
the operator of the spa is a private owner but has no protections if the operator of the
facility is the government.
It is clear that the legislature intended a spa operated by the government to be
exempt only from the bonding requirements of the Act, but not from the other protections
of Act, as defined by the rules of the Division. The legislature saw no reason to require
the government to post a bond, given the almost unlimited resources and abilities of the
government. The theory, in this context, is that if the government closed a facility with
unexpired membership contracts, the government would have sufficient resources to
insure that the members of the public holding such contracts would get their money back.
In other areas, the government is routinely exempted from the requirement to post
a bond. Examples of this are such things as prejudgment writs, injunctions and appeals.
In such situations, it is presumed that the government, having its resources and abilities,
will be able to cover any eventual damages assessed. Accordingly, the Act gives a similar
exemption from the filing of a bond to a health spa operated by the government.
However, it is absurd to argue that being exempted from the requirements of a
bond also exempts the government from giving the other protections that the Act and the
Rule clearly intended to provide. If the Act, and the rules promulgated by the Division,
grant to the consumer the further protection that a purchase of a health spa facility will
honor an unexpired contract, that same protection should be afforded to the consumer
when the government is the purchaser. Otherwise, the consumer is actually damaged
when the government is the purchaser of the facility.
Rule 152-7-2 specifically declares:
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These rules shall apply to the conduct of every health spa business within
the state of Utah.
In addition, the rules of the Division are careful to note that included within the coverage
of the rules are both "health spa businesses" and "health spa facilities." Rule 152-7-3.F is
careful to define a "health spa business" as "the business of buying, operating and selling
health spa facilities and shall include all acts related thereto." At the same time, the Rule
defines a health spa facility entirely differently. Rule 152-7-3.G defines a "health spa
facility" as "the physical facility at which the services of health spa business are provided
to its members." Thus, the rules are intended to cover not only the sale of the business
but also the sale of the physical facilities themselves.
The specific rule invalidated by the trial court was Rl 52-7-4.F, which states:
F. The purchaser of a Health Spa Facility shall replace the Seller as a
party to any unexpired Membership Contract and shall honor all
Membership Contracts of the purchased facility in effect at the time of the
purchase, pursuant to Section 13-23-5(2) of the Act.
The trial court ruled that this requirement did not apply to government owned facilities
despite that fact that the Rule states that all operators of spa facilities are to honor the
unexpired membership contracts relating to that facility. The Rule, quite appropriately,
does not exempt government owners nor should it give such exemption.
The trial court did not need to invalidate the Rule because the Act does not require
the government to post a bond. It could, quite as easily, have appropriately ruled that
even though the government need not post a bond, if it purchases a spa facility, it must
honor unexpired contracts. By so doing, the trial court would have granted to the public
the same protections, whether the purchaser was the government or was a private
individual.
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The absurdity of the court's interpretation of the statute and its invalidation of the
Rule is best illustrated by the effect that the ruling has on the public. The Act was
specifically passed to give the spa-using public some protection. Before the Act,
operators of spa facilities would sell multi-year membership contracts, people would pay
their money, and the next thing the people knew, the spa facility had closed and the
people had no way to recoup their loss. In response to this problem, the legislature passed
the Act that has the significant protection of requiring a bond. No one would argue with
the theory that the government, if it owned a spa, need not put up a bond for two reasons:
(a) the government has supposedly unlimited resources and would in no way leave the
innocent consuming public "holding the bag"; and (b) there would be no need to burden
state resources with the filing of a bond.
Endowed with rulemaking authority, the Division enacted rules that would give
full effect to the protections of the Act. The specific rule in question provided that if one
were to purchase a spa facility, one should be aware that unexpired membership contracts
become the buyer's responsibility. Thus, the Division no doubt determined, the
consuming public would be assured of its right to use the very facility for which they had
an unexpired contract.
The system was foolproof until Salt Lake County purchased the spa facility
previously operated by Quest Sport & Fitness. The spa facility had unexpired contracts.
The spa operator was unable to continue and filed a bankruptcy. The County is charged
with knowledge of the Rule when it purchased the facility. However, because of the
ruling of the court below, the County can, in essence, "thumb its nose" at those members
of the public with unexpired contracts and refuse to honor the same.
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The simple fact is that if this spa had been purchased by a private business, the
Division would, in all of its righteous indignation, be insisting that such private business
honor the unexpired contracts. There is no doubt of this. Such is the clear wording and
intent of the Rule. However, the Division's interpretation, backed by the trial court's
ruling, is that not only does the County not have to put up a bond to operate the facility,
but it need not protect the members of the public with unexpired contracts. In
otherwords, because of the trial court's ruling, if the spa operator is the County, there are
no protections whatsoever for the public. In every way, the consumer loses all of the
protections of the Act when the County is the buyer of the facility.
This absurdity could easily have been avoided without doing violence to the Act
or invalidating the Rule. If the Rule in question had stated that a governmentally-owned
spa facility must put up a bond, despite the clear exemption of the statute, the rule would
clearly be beyond the bounds of the statute and be invalid. The Rule did no such thing.
The Rule recognized that the County did not have to put up a bond but saw no harm in
making all spa facility owners, whether government or otherwise, honor the
unexpired contracts of the facility members. If the Rule had been upheld by the trial
court, the statute would be unscathed and the public would be protected to the maximum
degree intended by the Act, and the rules.
The first law of legislative interpretation is that the plain language of the statute is
to be given effect. The Court is not to go outside of that plain language to a strained,
unlikely or absurd result. By holding the Rule invalid, and not forcing the County to
comply with it, the trial court came to just such a result. If the trial court had interpreted
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the statute correctly to the effect that the County was waived of any bond only, the Rule
could stand and the public could be protected.
It should not be lost in this argument that by choosing the route of calling the
bond, the Division will, in essence, return to the public far less than 50% of the public's
loss. The bond money is not large enough to go around. However, if the Division had
enforced its Rule with the County-owned spa operator, the consuming public would have
zero loss.
Point II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE RULE WAS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSE THE OPERATOR OF THE
FACILITY WAS NOT THE SELLER OF THE FACILITY
There is an additional form-over-substance argument made by the Division as the
basis for dismissing this appeal. It is undisputed that the spa facility, itself, was being
operated under a lease. Quest Sport & Fitness was the operator and Country Courthouse
Trust was the owner of the facility. The Division argues, therefore, that the membership
contracts were with the operator, not the owner, and that the Rule does not apply. This
argument entirely ignores the great lengths to which the Division went in making sure
that not only the operator of a health spa business, but also the operator of a health spa
facility was covered by the Rule. The Division defines "business" separately from
"facility." The Rule specifically provides that the operator of a facility must honor the
unexpired contract, not just the operator of the business.
Again, the Rule was designed to give maximum protection to the public and to
avoid just this situation. If the County had purchased this building and made it a
warehouse, perhaps an argument could be made that the Rule was inapplicable.
13

However, the County did buy it as a spa facility, and is running it as a health spa facility.
The argument of the County is nothing more than form over substance.
CONCLUSION
This appeal has been brought for the reason that the trial court's ruling
unnecessarily removes from the public any of the protections of the Act when the
government, and not a private individual, operates a spa facility. Such intent cannot be
read into the Act by the Legislature. No where in the Act can it be said that the
Legislature intended to give spa users protection if it was a private individual but give
them no protection if it was a government. It is clear that the Legislature exempted the
government from the requirements of a bond only. The other protections of the Act
should be afforded to all users of spa facilities. The County should be required, just like
any other owner of a spa facility, to honor the unexptred^membership contracts.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of January, 1998.

DukieR. Smith x /s
Attorney for Appellant Miller
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ADDENDUM 1
HEALTH SPA SERVICES PROTECTION ACT

CHAPTER 23
HEALTH SPAS
Compiler's Notes, - This chapter was enacted as Title 13, Chapter 22 but because of duplicate
numbering at the 1987 session, was renumbered as Chapter 23.
Section

13-23-1.
13-23-2.
13-23-3.
13-23-4.
13-23-5.
13-23-6.
13-23-7.

Short title.
Definitions.
Contracts for health spa services.
Rescission.
Registration - Bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit required Penalties.
Exemptions from bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit requirement
Enforcement - Costs and attorney's fees - Penalties.

13-23-1. Short title.
This chapter is known as the "Health Spa Services Protection Act"
History: C. 1953,13-22-1, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-1.
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority
for the following administrative rule(s): R152-7.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Liability of proprietor of private gymnasium, reducing salon, or similar health club for injury to
patron,79A.LR.4th127.

13-23-2- Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Consumer" means a purchaser of health spa services for valuable consideration.
(2) "Division" means Division of Consumer Protection.
(3) (a) "Health spa" means any person, partnership, joint venture, corporation, association, or
other entity that, for a charge or fee, provides as one of its primary purposes services or facilities
that are purported to assist patrons to improve their physical condition or appearance through
change in weight, weight control, treatment, dieting, aerobic conditioning, strength training, or
other exercise. It includes any establishment designated as a "reducing salon," "health spa,"
"spa," "exercise gym," "health studio," "health club," or by other similar terms.
(b) "Health spa" does not include:
(i) any facility operated by a licensed physician at which the physician engages in the practice
of medicine;
(ii) any facility operated by a health care provider, hospital, intermediate care facility, or
skilled nursing care facility;
(iii) any public or private school, college, or university;
(iv) any facility owned or operated by the state or its political subdivisions; or
(v) any facility owned or operated by the United States or its political subdivisions.
(4) "Health spa services" means any service provided by a health spa, including athletic
facilities, equipment, and instruction.
History: C. 1953, 13-22-2, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 6; recompiled as C 1953,13-23-2;
(c) 1953-1995 by Michic Butterworth, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

L. 1988, ch. 43, § 1; 1995, ch. 89, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1988 amendment, effective March 9, 1988, rewrote Subsection (3)(b)(i),
which had read "any nonprofit organization/1 and made a minor stylistic change.
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted former Subsection (3)(b)(i) which read "any
exempt organization as defined in Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue code" and made related
subsection ^designations.

13-23-3. Contracts for health spa services,
(1) Any contract for the sale of health spa services shall be in writing. The written contract
shall constitute the entire agreement between the consumer and the health spa.
(2) The health spa shall provide the consumer with a fully completed copy of the contract at
the time of its execution. The copy shall show:
(a) the date of the transaction;
(b) the name and address of the health spa; and
(c) the name, address, and telephone number of theconsumer.
(3) A contract may not have a term in excess of 36 months, but the contract may provide that
the consumer may exercise an option to renew the term after its expiration. Except for a lifetime
membership sold prior to May 1,1995, a health spa may not offer a lifetime membership.
(4) The contract or an attachment to it shall clearly state any rules of the health spa that
apply to the consumer's use of its facilities and services and cancellation and refund policies of
the health spa.
(5) The contract shall specify which equipment or facility of the health spa is omitted from
the contract's coverage or which may be changed at the health spa's discretion.
(6) The contract shall clearly state that the consumer has a three-day recision right provided
in Section 13-23-4.
History: C. 1953,13-22-3, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 7; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-3;
1995, ch. 89, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection (2)(c), the
second sentence of Subsection (3), and Subsections (5) and (6) and made related and stylistic changes.

13-23-4. Rescission.
(1) A consumer may rescind a contract for the purchase of health spa services if he enters
into the contract and gives value at a time when the health spa is not fully operational and
available for use, and if the health spa does not become fully operational and available for use
within 60 days after the date of the contract.
(2) A consumer's right to rescind his contract under this section continues for three business
days after the health spa becomes fully operational and available for use.
(3) A consumer who rescinds his contract under this section is entitled to a refund of any
payments he has made, less the reasonable value of any health spa services he actually received
or $25, whichever is less. The preparation and processing of the contract and other documents are
not considered to be health spa services that are deductible under this subsection from any
refundable amount.
(4) Any rescission of a contract under this section is effective upon the health spa's receipt of
written notice of the consumer's intent to rescind the contract. The notice may be delivered by
hand or mailed by certified mail postmarked no later than midnight of the third day after the
health spa becomes fully operational and available for use.
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History: C. 1953, 13-22-4, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 8; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-4.
13-23-5, Registration - Bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit required Penalties*
(1) (a) (i) It is unlawful for any health spa facility to operate in this state unless the facility is
registered with the division.
(ii) Registration is effective for one year. If the health spa facility renews its registration, the
registration shall be renewed at least 30 days prior to its expiration.
(iii) The division shall provide by rule for the form, content, application process, and renewal
process of the registration.
(b) Each health spa registering in this state shall designate a registered agent for receiving
service of process. The registered agent shall be reasonably available from 8 a.m. until 5 p.m.
during normal working days.
(c) The division shall charge and collect a fee for registration under guidelines provided in
Section 63-38-3.2.
(2) (a) Each health spa shall obtain and maintain:
(i) a performance bond issued by a surety authorized to transact surety business in this state;
(ii) an irrevocable letter of credit issued by a financial institution authorized to do business in
this state; or
(iii) a certificate of deposit.
(b) The bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit shall be payable to the division for the
benefit of any consumer who incurs damages as the result of:
(i) the health spa's violation of this chapter; or
(ii) as the result of the health spa's going out of business or relocating and failing to offer an
alternate location within ten miles.
(c) The division may recover from the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit the costs
of collecting and distributing funds under this section, up to 10% of the face value of the bond,
letter of credit, or certificate of deposit but only if the consumers have fully recovered their
damages first. The total liability of the issuer of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit
may not exceed the amount of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit. The health spa
shall maintain a bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit in force for one year after it
notifies the division in writing that it has ceased all activities regulated by this chapter.
(d) A health spa providing services at more than one location shall comply with the
requirements of Subsection (2)(a) for each separate location.
(e) The division may impose a fine against a health spa that fails to comply with the
requirements of Subsection (2)(a) of up to $100 per day that the health spa remains out of
compliance. All penalties received shall be deposited into the Consumer Protection Education
and Training Fund created in Section 13-2-8.
(3) The minimum principal amount of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of credit
required under Subsection (2) shall be based on the number of unexpired contracts for health spa
services to which the health spa is a party, in accordance with the following schedule:
Principal Amount of
Bond, Letter of Credit,
or Certificate of Deposit
$15,000
35,000
50,000
75,000

Number of Contracts
with an Unexpired Term
Exceeding 90 Days
500 or fewer
501 to 1,500
1,501 to 3,000
3,001 or more

(4) Each health spa shall obtain the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit and furnish
a certified copy of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit to the division prior to
(c) 1953-1995 by Michie Butterworth, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

selling, offering or attempting to sell, soliciting the sale of, or becoming a party to any contract to
provide health spa services. A health spa is considered to be in compliance with this section only
if the proof provided to the division shows that the bond, letter of credit, or certificate of credit is
current.
(5) Each health spa shall maintain accurate records of the bond, letter of credit, or certificate
of credit and of any payments made, due, or to become due to the issuer and shall open the
records to inspection by the division at any time during normal business hours.
(6) If a health spa changes ownership, ceases operation, discontinues facilities, or relocates
and fails to offer an alternate location within ten miles within 30 days after its closing, the health
spa is subject to the requirements of this section as if it were a new health spa coming into being
at the time the health spa changed ownership. The former owner may not release, cancel, or
terminate the owner's liability under any bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit previously
filed with the division, unless:
(a) the new owner has filed a new bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit for the
benefit of consumers covered under the previous owner's bond, letter of credit, or certificate of
deposit; or
(b) the former owner has refunded all unearned payments to consumers.
(7) If a health spa ceases operation or relocates and fails to offer an alternative location
within ten miles, the health spa shall provide the division with 45 days prior notice.
History: C. 1953,13-22-5, enacted by L. 1987, ch, 105, § 9; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-5;
L. 1991, ch. 128, § 1; 1995, ch. 89, § 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment effective April 29, 1991, in Subsection (1) added the
phrase beginning "or as the result" at the end of the second sentence and added the next-to-last
sentence; and substituted the language ending "the health spa is subject" for "A change in the ownership
of a health spa subjects the health spa" in the first sentence in the introductory paragraph of Subsection
(5).
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsections (1), (2)(a)(iii), (2)(d), (2)(e), and (7),
and the last sentence in Subsection (2)(d); substituted "ten miles" for "15 miles" in Subsections (2)(b)(ii)
and (6); inserted "or certificate of deposit' after "letter of credit" throughout the section; increased the
dollar amounts and several of the contract figures in the schedule in Subsection (3); inserted "discontinues
facilities" in Subsection (6); and made numerous related and other stylistic changes.

13-23-6. Exemptions from bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit requirement
A health spa which offers no paid-in-full membership, but only memberships paid for by
installment contracts is exempt from the application of Section 13-23-5 if:
(1) each contract contains the following clause: "If this health spa ceases operation and fails
to offer an alternate location within ten miles, no further payments under this contract shall be
due to anyone, including any purchaser of any note associated with or contained in this
contract";
(2) all payments due under each contract, including down payments, enrollment fees,
membership fees, or any other payments to the health spa, are in equal monthly installments
spread over the entire term of the contract; and
(3) the term of each contract is clearly stated and is not capable of being extended.
History: C. 1953,13-22-6, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 10; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-6;
L. 1991, ch. 128, § 2; 1995, ch. 89, § 4.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, designated the former
introductory language as part of Subsection (1), inserted the introductory language in Subsection (2), and
made related changes.
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The 1995 amendment effective May 1, 1995, deleted former Subsection (1) relating to conditions for
exemption of a health spa from application of Section 13-23-5; redesignated the remainder of the section;
and substituted "ten miles" for "15 miles" in Subsection (1).

13-23-7. Enforcement - Costs and attorney's fees - Penalties.
(1) The division may, on behalf of any consumer or on its own behalf, file an action for
injunctive relief, damages, or both to enforce this chapter. In addition to any relief granted, the
division is entitled to an award for reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and reasonable
investigative expenses.
(2) (a) A person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter, either by failing to
comply with any requirement or by doing any act prohibited in this chapter, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Each day the violation is committed or permitted to continue constitutes a separate
punishable offense.
(b) In the case of a second offense, the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) In the case of three or more offenses, the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953,13-22-7, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 105, § 11; recompiled as C. 1953,13-23-7;
1995, ch. 89, § 5.
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, designated the existing
paragraph as Subsection (1), added Subsection (2), and made a stylistic change.
Cross-References. - Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.
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ADDENDUM 2
RULE Rl 52-7

R152-6-1

COMMERCE

c. near the signature of the person entering into
the consumer transaction, in bold type which is 10
points or larger: *l UNDERSTAND THAT THIS
CONSUMER TRANSACTION INVOLVES A
NEGATIVE OPTION, AND THAT I MAY BE LIABLE FOR PAYMENT OF FUTURE GOODS AND
SERVICES UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS
AGREEMENT IF I FAIL TO NOTIFY THE SUPPLIER NOT TO SUPPLY THE GOODS OR SERVICES DESCRIBED."
1991
16-13,13-11-8,13-11-4,13-11-6
R152-6. U t a h A d m i n i s t r a t i v e P r o c e d u r e s
Act Rules.
R152-6-1. Designation of Adjudicative Proceedings.
R152-6-2. Designation of Presiding Officer.

R152-6-1. Designation of Adjudicative Proceedings.
A. All adjudicative proceedings within the Division shall be informal.
B. No hearing will be held unless specifically
allowed or required under any laws administered by
the Division, or by the Utah. Administrative Procedures Act If a hearing is allowed, it will be held only
if timely requested pursuant to Department Rule
151-46b-10.
R152-6-2. Designation of Presiding Officer.
The presiding officer in any proceeding shall be
the director of die division. The director may designate another person to act as presiding officer in any
proceeding or portion thereof.
1992
13-2-5(1)
R152-7. U t a h H e a l t h S p a S e r v i c e s .
R152-7-1.
R152-7-2.
R152-7-3.
R152-7-4.
R152-7-5.
R152-7-6.

Authority.
Scope and Applicability.
Definitions.
Contracts for Health Spa Services.
Rescission.
Bond or Letter of Credit Required.

RI52-7-7. Enforcement.

R152-7-1. Authority.
These Rules are promulgated in accordance with
the provisions of Section 63-46a-3, and Section 132-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, to prescribe for the administration of the Utah Health Spa
Act, Section 13-23-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953),
as amended, the "Act*.
R152-7-2. Scope and Applicability.
These rules shall apply to the conduct of every
Health Spa Business within the State of Utah.
R l 52-7-3. Definitions.
A. "Advance Sales," shall mean sales of membership contracts on any date prior to the date a health
spa facility shall be open and available to provide
services to purchasers.
3

B. "Bond" or Tetter of Credit* shall mean an
instrument containing a promise from a third party
to pay to the Division of Consumer Protection for the
benefit of purchasers of membership contracts the
dollar value of the unused portion of such purchaser's membership in the event the health spa facility
shall be unable to or refuse to provide health services pursuant to such Membership Contract.
C. "Costs" shall mean those costs incurred by the
Division in investigating complaints, administeringrescission of membership contracts or fulfilling its
responsibilities under the Utah Health Spa Act or
Rules promulgated thereunder.
D. "Department" shall mean the Department of
Commerce of the State of Utah.
E. "Division" shall mean the Division of Consumer
Protection of the Department of Commerce of the
State of Utah.
F. "Health Spa Business" shall mean the business
of buying, operating and selling health spa facilities
and shall include all acts related thereto.
G. "Health Spa Facility" shall mean the physical
facilities at which the services of a health spa
business are provided to its members.
H. "Member* shall mean the purchaser of a Membership contract pursuant to which the member
anticipates receipt of health spa services in exchange for consideration given by such purchaser.
I. "Membership Contract" shall mean a legally
binding obligation pursuant to which a purchaser
agrees to give consideration in exchange for membership privileges which the seller shall be obligated
to provide.
J. "Rescission" shall mean the process of canceling
a membership contract and refunding to the purchaser thereof the dollar value of the consideration
paid for services which have not been provided as of
the date of cancellation.
R152-7-4. Contracts for Health Spa Services.
A Prior to selling or attempting to sell a Membership Contract, the following documentation must be
filed with the Division:
1. Name of owner(s) of the Health Spa Facility.
2. Notice of intent to sell memberships.
3. The original or a certified copy of the Bond or
Letter of Credit which will secure purchaser's Membership Contract. The amount of such surety shall
be based upon the number and cost of memberships
offered as per Section 13-23-5(2), of the Act.
B. Each Membership Contract shall contain a
provision, printed in all capital letters which reads
substantially as follows: "IN THE EVENT THE
HEALTH SPA FACILITY CLOSES AND ANOTHER
HEALTH SPA FACILITY OPERATED BY THE
SELLER, OR ASSIGNS OF THE SELLER, OF
THIS CONTRACT IS NOT AVAILABLE WITHIN A
FIFTEEN (15) MILE RADIUS OF THE LOCATION
THE MEMBER INTENDS TO PATRONIZE,
SELLER WILL REFUND TO MEMBER A PRORATA SHARE OF THE MEMBERSHIP COST,
BASED UPON THE UNUSED MEMBERSHIP
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TIME REMAINING ACCORDING TO THE CONTRACT.*
C. All Membership Contracts sold prior to opening
of the health spa facility shall allow the buyer a
three (3) day right of rescission in accordance with
Section 13-23-4 of the Act, or Section 13-ll-4<m) of
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act
D. The dollar value of a Membership Contract
shall be clearly stated on the face of the contract.
E. In any event, no Membership Contract shall be
sold which provides a membership term of longer
than thirty-six (36) months.
F. The purchaser of a Health Spa Facility shall
replace the Seller as a party to any unexpired
Membership Contract and shall honor all Membership Contracts of the purchased facility in effect at
the time of purchase, pursuant to Section 13-23-6(2)
of the Act In the event a Health Spa Facility shall be
sold under circumstances which will result in its
closure and the purchaser shall not operate a Health
Spa Facility within 15 miles thereof, purchaser must
notify Members of such closure in writing within 10
days of the date of sale. Members may cancel their
outstanding Membership Contracts or may choose
to continue their Membership Contract in force.
Notice of such election shall be in writing mailed to
the purchaser within 30 days of the receipt of notice
of closure of the acquired Health Spa Facility.

R152-7-7

multiplying the number of months remaining on
claimant's membership term as of the date of closure
by the monthly cost of such membership to the
member at the time of purchase. Periods of less than
a full month shall be compensated by determining a
daily cost of membership and multiplying such daily
cost by the number of unused membership days in
such period.
E. Refunds shall be made to claimants within 90
days following the final date for submission of claims
in accordance with the procedures specified above.
F. The Division may recover from the funds deposited in escrow pursuant to this Rule, its costs,
including investigative costs, processing costs, attorneys fees and other expenses related to administration of rescissions made under these rules.
G. In the event there shall be funds remaining
after full refund to all claimant* and payment of
costs of the Division, such excess shall be returned to
Owners of the Health Spa Facility.

R152-7-6. Bond or Letter of Credit Required.
A. Except as provided in Section 13-23-6, of the
Act, all Health Spa Facilities shall be covered by a
performance Bond or Letter of Credit payable to the
Division in an amount to be determined by the
number and cost of membership contracts sold by
the Health Spa Facility.
B. Originals or certified copies of such Bonds or
Letters of Credit shall be provided to the Division
R152-7-5. Rescission*
not less than 10 days in advance of the first sale or
A. In the event a Health Spa Facility shall, for any attempt to sell made by any Health Spa Facility.
reason, close, discontinue normal operations or oth- Annual renewals of such Bonds or Letters of Credit
erwise cease to do business while having outstand- shall be filed with the Division at least 30 days in
ing obligations to provide membership services to advance of expiration of existing Bonds or Letters of
members holding valid membership contracts, the Credit
Health Spa Facility must offer, in writing, to rescind
C. The Division shall have the right to approve or
all such membership contracts and to refund the
reject
Bonds or Letters of Credit submitted in com*
unused portion of all Member's membership fees.
Such written offer of rescission shall establish the pliance with this Rule. In the event a Bond or Letter
procedure and time limit for acceptance of the re- of Credit is rejected by the Division, the Health Spa
Facility shall submit another within 15 days follow*
scission offer and obtaining the desired refund.
ing notice by the Division. In no event shall a Health
B. An offer of rescission shall be made to each Spa Facility conduct business without a Bond or
purchaser whose Membership Contract is valid on Letter of Credit in effect
the last day the Health Spa Facility is open for
D. A Health Spa Facility which allows Bonds or
business. The Health Spa Facility shall provide the
Letters
of Credit to expire without filing renewal as
Division with a list of Membership Contracts valid
provided
herein, may be allowed, at the discretion of
on the date of closure within 10 business days of
the
Division,
to register as a new Health Spa Facilsuch closure.
ity
pursuant
to the provisions of R152-7-4 and
C. Money to be refunded to members upon closure
R152-7-6,
hereof!
of a Health Spa Facility under these Rules shall be
placed in escrow with a bank or other financial R152-7-7. Enforcement
A. The Division may be entitled to recover costs,
institution previously approved by the Division.
Such funds shall come from a Bond or Letter of including investigative costs, processing costs, attorCredit payable to the Division.
neys fees and other costs incurred in administration
D. Refunds shall be made to Members who submit of these rules. Upon election of the parties, payment
claims within a time period to be prescribed by the of such costs shall be made from the proceeds of the
Division. Such refunds shall be made under the Bond or Letter of Credit
supervision of the Division and shall, if insufficient
B. Any payment made to the Division shall be
funds are available for full refund, be made on a approved by the Executive Director of the Departprorata basis based upon the full amount due a ment of Commerce.
claimant The amount due shall be determined by 1990
63-46a-3, 13*2-5,13-23-1, et seq.

January 1, 1995
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through the
DIVISION OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VS.

BOYD L. JENTZSCH dba QUEST
SPORT & FITNESS, et al.
Defendants.
DAVID W. MILLER,

Civil No. 950906098AA
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, et al.
Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on April 10, 1997 on the
motions for summary judgment filed concurrently by the State of Utah, Salt Lake County,

and David W. Miller. Jeffrey S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General, appeared for and on
behalf of the State of Utah. Brendan P. McCullagh, Special Deputy County Attorney,
appeared for and on behalf of Salt Lake County. Duane R. Smith, appeared on behalf of
David W. Miller and also on behalf of the defendants, Homestead Insurance Company and
International Special Events & Recreation Association. Boyd L. Jentzsch was also present.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS.
After reviewing the file, including the Stipulation filed with the Court on November
13, 1996, and the respective motions, memoranda, and affidavits of the parties, the Court
hereby finds that the following facts are undisputed:
1. From a time prior to January 1, 1993 until January 3, 1995, Boyd L. Jentzsch
("Jentzsch") d.b.a. Quest Sport & Fitness operated a health spa located at approximately
10300 South Redwood Road, South Jordan, State of Utah.1
2. On or about August 10, 1994, Jentzsch signed and submitted to the Utah Division
of Consumer Protection (the "Division"), an application for a permit to operate a health spa
at 10300 South Redwood Road in South Jordan, Utah.2
'Memorandum in Support of Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment ("County Memo"),
p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, f 1); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
("Miller Memo"), p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, HI).
2

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("State
Memo"), p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, If 1).

3. The Health Spa Permit Application identified Jentzsch as the owner of the health
spa facility operating under the name of Quest Sport & Fitness (hereinafter referred to as
"Quest").3
4. Neither Quest nor Jentzsch owned the facility located at 10300 South Redwood
Road, South Jordan, Utah wherein Quest provided health spa services to its members (the
"facility").4
5. The facility was owned by the Country Court House Trust who leased the same
to Quest "for the purpose of conducting thereon the business of a health club and for
incidental purposes related thereto . . . ."5
6. Quest did not have any interest in the facility other than as a lessee thereof.6
7. The Division required Quest to obtain and provide to the Division a bond in the
sum of $50,000.00 in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5 (1990).7
8. On or about September 21, 1994, Jentzsch submitted to the Division a Contractual
Liability and Financial Guaranty Coverage Agreement to serve as a bond under the Health
Spa Services Protection Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-23-1 (1991).8
3
4

State Memo, p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, ^2).

State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, %3); County Memo, p. 2 (Uncontested Facts, ^2).

5

County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 1f3); State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 1[4). See also Miller Memo,
p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1(5).
6

State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, <[5); see also County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, T[4)

7

Miller Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 1f2); County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, %5).

8

State Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, 1[6).

HHl

9. The Contractual Liability and Financial Guaranty Coverage Agreement
(hereinafter referred to as the "Bond") identifies Boyd Jentzsch (dba) Quest Sport & Fitness
as the "participating member" and identifies the defendants, Homestead Insurance Company
and International Special Events and Recreation Association (hereinafter collectively referred
to as "Homestead"), as the insurers.9
10.

The Bond was effective for a term of one year, beginning on August 10, 1994,

and required Homestead to pay to the Division up to $50,000.00 in the event of a default by
Jentzsch of his obligations under the Health Spa Services Protection Act.10
11.

In order to secure the Bond, Homestead required Quest to obtain the personal

guarantee of an individual acceptable to Homestead, which, in this case, was David W.
Miller.11
12.

Accordingly, David W. Miller executed a personal guarantee and indemnity

in order to allow the Bond to be issued.12
13.

With the Bond in place, Quest sold prepaid membership contracts to

consumers.13

9

State Memo, pp. 3-4 (Uncontested Facts, f7).

,0

State Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, ^[8).

"Miller Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, f3); County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, ^[6).
,2

MilIer Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f4).

l3

County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, f7).

14.

Quest closed, discontinued normal operations, or otherwise ceased to do

business on or about January 3, 1995 by virtue of actions taken by the bankruptcy trustee in
In re Quest Sport & Fitness, Inc., Case No. 93-23701.14
15.

At the time Quest closed, discontinued normal operations, or otherwise ceased

to do business on January 3, 1995, there existed and there now exists no less than $50,000.00
in outstanding obligations to Quest members holding valid, unexpired membership contracts
for health spa services.15
16.

The unexpired membership contracts at the time of closure were, for the most

part, one-year memberships with a few memberships extending no more than three years.16
17.

As a result of actions taken in the bankruptcy case, Quest members were denied

further access to the health spa facility.17
18.

Quest did not provide an alternate location to Health Spa members holding

valid, unexpired membership contracts at the time Quest closed.18

14

State Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f9); County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f 10); see also Stipulation,
1f 1 (filed with the Third District Court on November 13, 1996). Compare Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f6)
and County Memo, p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, ^8) with State's Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Opposition to
David W. Miller's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2 (Statement of Contested Facts, 1fl).
|S

State Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, If 10); Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, f7). See County Memo,
p. 3 (Uncontested Facts, Tf9); see also Stipulation, 1f 2 (filed with the Third District Court on November 13, 1996).
l6

Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, Tf 10).

17

County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1f 11).

l8

State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, 1[13).

19.

Within one week after closure of Quest, the Division notified Homestead, both

verbally and in writing, of Quest's default under the Act, which notification included a letter
dated January 6, 1995 and received on January 9, 1995.19
20.

The Division has made demand upon Homestead to pay $50,000.00, payable

on a pro rata basis, to the holders of the unexpired membership contracts.20
21.

Neither Quest nor Homestead has submitted any funds for the purpose of

refunding the unused portion of membership fees paid by Quest members holding valid,
unexpired membership contracts at the time Quest closed.21
22.

The Country Court House Trust sold the facility to Salt Lake County on or

about June 15, 1995 after which Salt Lake County reopened the facility and provided the
same services as had been provided by Quest.22
23.

There are no references to health spa membership contracts in the purchase

agreement between the Country Court House Trust and Salt Lake County.23
24.

Salt Lake County has not filed a bond, letter of credit, or certificate of deposit

with the Division nor has the Division required Salt Lake County to do so.24
l9

State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, fl 1).

20

Miller Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, %9).

21

State's Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, f 12).

22

County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 1fl[l2-l3); State Memo, p. 5 (Uncontested Facts, ^[14); Miller Memo,
p 4, (Uncontested Facts, 1(8).
23

County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, If 14).

24

County Memo, p. 4 (Uncontested Facts, 115); State Memo, p 5 (Uncontested Facts, f 15).
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II. DECISION OF THE COURT.
Given the foregoing undisputed facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party, the Court concludes that there are no material issues of fact in
dispute and that the State of Utah and Salt Lake County are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Therefore, the Court grants the motions for summary judgment of the State of Utah
and of Salt Lake County and denies the motion for summary judgment of David W. Miller.
The Court's decision is based on the following grounds:
(1)

The Bond submitted by Quest and issued by Homestead satisfies the

requirements of Section 13-23-5(3) of the Act and was a valid, enforceable bond at the
time of Quest's closure.
(2)

Quest's closure on or about January 3, 1995 and the absence of an alternate

health spa facility operated by Quest or its assigns within a 15-mile radius of the facility
created an obligation upon Quest to refund the unused portion of membership fees to all
members holding valid, unexpired membership contracts with Quest at the time of closure.
Utah Admin. R152-7-4 (1990).
(3)

The State is entitled to recover from Homestead the full amount on the

Bond ($50,000.00) by virtue of Quest's failure to refund the unused portion of membership
fees to all members holding valid, unexpired membership contracts with Quest at the time
of closure. Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5 (1991); Utah Admin. R152-7-5.C (1990).

Mm

(4)

Rule 152-7-4.F of the Utah Administrative Code does not impose upon Salt

Lake County an obligation to honor the membership contracts of Quest in effect at the time
of the purchase of the facility on June 15, 1995 for the following reasons:
(a) By definition, Salt Lake County is exempt from operation of the Act under
the clear and unambiguous language of Section 13-23-2 which provides that a health
spa does not include "any facility owned or operated by the state or its political
subdivisions." Utah Code Ann. §13-23-2(3)(b)(iv) (1991);
(b) Because administrative regulations may not extend beyond the scope of a
statute, the rules promulgated under the Act, Utah Admin. R152-7-1 et. seq.
(1990), are invalid to the extent they appear to impose obligations upon Salt Lake
County as a political subdivision of the State;
(c) Even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the
Act, Salt Lake County would not be required to assume the unexpired membership
contracts of Quest because Rule 152-7-4.F requires that the purchaser of the facility
replace "the Seller as a party to any unexpired Membership Contract;" the seller
in this case, however, was the Country Court House Trust, not Quest;
(d) Even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the
Act, under Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5(5) (1991), Homestead was not released from
its obligation under the Bond by virtue of the sale of the facility because (1) Quest
8

had not refunded all unearned payments to consumers, and (2) Salt Lake County did
not file a new bond or letter of credit; and
(e) Even if the Court were to assume that Salt Lake County was subject to the
Act, because the purchase of the facility occurred a full five (5) months after its
closure, the regulations governing closure of a facility applied rather than the
regulations governing the purchase of a facility.
JUDGMENT
NOW, THEREFORE, the Bond is forfeited and the plaintiff, State of Utah, is hereby
awarded judgment against Homestead in the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) for
the benefit of former Quest members who incurred damages as the result of Quest's going
out of business and subsequent failure to refund to its members the unused portion of their
membership fees. Utah Code Ann. §13-23-5 (1991).
Judgment is also awarded to defendants, State of Utah and Salt Lake County,
against plaintiff, David W. Miller, whose complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this #

day of May, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

A' x H ^ y
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SH

ly for Davia WTMiller, Homestead Insurance
Company, and the International Special Events
& Recreation Association

BrendarTP. McCu
Attorney for

10
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2

THE COURT:

3

All right.

I've considered these

4

various motions, and it is not disputed that there are no

5

material issues of fact in dispute and that the issues

6

presented to the Court are matters wholly related to law

7

and not fact.

8

course, the undisputed facts, and I won't reiterate those

9

now.

I will then incorporate in this ruling, of

This turns on the analysis of the statutes,

10
11

Section 13-23-1 et seq. , I believe —

or it may start at

12

2 —

13

are argued in the briefs.

14

been established that also have been briefed.

and the various specific provisions of the act that
There are also rules that have

I would say, from the outset, that —

15

obviously,

16

the standard that must be applied is that the —

17

may —

18

of fact that are material and the moving party must show,

19

as a matter of law, that he or she or it is entitled to

20

prevail.

21
22
23
24
25

there

in summary judgment, there may be no disputed issues

And all reasonable inferences must be drawn in

favor of the non-moving party.
This is a —

Mr. Jentzsch did not file a motion.

He is a dba for an entity against whom summary judgment has
been filed.

His arguments are essentially in line with the

arguments presented by David Miller and the bonding

WW

company, but some comments go beyond the scope of the
issues raised in the pleadings.
And to that extent, although I've granted some
oral argument, what is before the Court are written
documents.

Those are actually the arguments of record.

I

have considered, though, all of the arguments that have
been presented to the Court and I am prepared to rule at
this time.

And I —

when Mr. Smith stated that counsel for

the State and County are not giving life to the statute and
that the rule, obviously, is in line with what the overall
tenet of the statute is, it must be remembered, of course,
that neither counsel nor the Court can breath life into any
statute that the Legislature has not already put there.
And the first analysis is whether the relevant
applicable statutes are clear and unambiguous.

If they are

clear and unambiguous, that is the end of the discussion.
It is Hornbook law, of course, to note that administrative
rules which are adopted, promulgated and adopted to
effectuate the statutes, must be within the bounds of the
statute.
have —

Otherwise, they are unenforceable.

They only

there's only authority invested in an

administrative entity to adopt rules that lie within the
bounds of the statute giving the entity the authority to
act in the first place.
So is the statute regarding what a health spa is

HW}.

1

and whose —

2

It is stated specifically in the statute that a health spa

3

does not include, (iv), "any facility owned or operated by

4

the state or its political subdivisions.11

5

the definition, if you will, of health spa.

Now, first, it is undisputed that Salt Lake

6

County is a political subdivision of the State of Utah.

7

The State of Utah is a plaintiff in this action also.

8

is a very clear, very plain, very unambiguous provision of

9

law and simply it clearly exempts the State and the County

10

from falling under the definition of those who are

11

operating a health spa —

12

this statutory provision.

13

This

well, at least consistent with

There is nothing else in the act itself that

14

gives rise to a claim that the State and County are

15

obligated to comply with the filing of bonds, letters of

16

credit and so forth.

17

have a unique relationship vis-a-vis their consumers than

18

does a private owner, be it a corporation or an individual

19

or otherw i s e.

20

And, certainly, governmental entities

I think we can safely assume that the State and

21

its political subdivisions are around and they are

22

locatable and they're not going to pack up and go away.

23

And there is a significant distinction that the Legislature

24

could clearly make between operators of such facilities and

25

the State and its political subdivisions.

5

It seems to me that the rule which has been
adopted cannot be —

cannot exceed what the Legislature's

restrictions have been.

And to the extent that this rule

appears to do so, it is invalid.

And that's not putting

the blinders on, that's just following the controlling
rules of statutory construction I and other entities are
compelled to follow and apply.
I am persuaded by each and every argument of the
State and the County in this case.

It seems to me it is

clear that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law.
And, accordingly, I grant the motions for summary judgment
of the State and of the County and deny the motion for
summary judgment of Mr. Miller and by the entities.
Mr. Jentzsch has not filed a motion, and so there
is no motion to grant or deny there.

But, obviously, this

constitutes a ruling against him as a matter of law, since
he is the dba for this entity.
Now, is there any —

I would also note, and it's

not disputed either, I note, by Mr. Miller that the County
was not a purchaser of this facility.

Even if it otherwise

could possibly be read as that, it cannot be because, well,
first, it's undisputed that it's not, but the reason that
it's undisputed that it's not a purchaser is because the
facility was closed a full five months or so before the
County entered into its acquisition of the property.

*M

MR. SMITH:

1

Your Honor, if I may interrupt, I

2

believe that is, indeed, the dispute.

3

be a purchaser of the facility, then the rule would apply.

4

Is the Court making a ruling that the rule is invalid?
THE COURT:

5

If they are found to

I said, to the extent the ruling of

6

the Court is to go beyond the clear and unambiguous

7

statutory provision, it is invalid.
MR. SMITH:

8
9

clarification.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

10
11

I was just asking for a

Yes.

All right.

questions about the Court's ruling?

12

MR. SMITH:

No, ma'am.

13

THE COURT:

All right.

14

Are there any

Thank you.

I presumed

not, since you finished talking.

15

MR. SMITH:

Sure.

Uh-huh.

16

THE COURT:

I'd like —

let's see, let's have

17

Mr. McCullagh prepare an order pertaining to the Court's

18

ruling in this matter.

19

with which this has been presented, and I thank you one and

20

all.

21
22

MR. GRAY:

And I appreciate the thoroughness

Your Honor, I'll go ahead and prepare

that, if that's okay.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. GRAY:

25

THE COURT:

You will, Mr. Gray?
Yes.
All right.

Then you may do so.

(Requested portion of transcript completed.)
* * * * *
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